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Abstract
This study examines how key market participants—managers and analysts—responded to SFAS
123R’s controversial requirement that firms recognize stock-based compensation expense.
Despite mandated recognition of the expense, some firms’ managers exclude it from pro forma
earnings and some firms’ analysts exclude it from Street earnings. We find evidence consistent
with managers opportunistically excluding the expense to increase earnings, smooth earnings,
and meet earnings benchmarks, but no evidence that such exclusion results in an earnings
measure that better predicts future firm performance. In contrast, we find that analysts exclude
the expense from earnings forecasts when the exclusion increases earnings’ predictive ability for
future performance, and opportunism generally does not explain exclusion by analysts
incremental to exclusion by managers. Thus, our findings indicate that opportunism is the
primary explanation for exclusion of the expense from pro forma earnings and predictive ability
is the primary explanation for exclusion from Street earnings. Our findings suggest the
controversy surrounding the recognition of stock-based compensation expense may be
attributable to cross-sectional variation in the relevance of the expense for equity valuation, as
well as to differing incentives of market participants.

JEL Classification: G10; M4; M41; M43; M45
Keywords: stock-based compensation; SFAS 123R; non-GAAP earnings; Street earnings; pro
forma earnings; earnings forecast exclusions; incentives

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1681144

Why Do Pro Forma and Street Earnings Not Reflect Changes in GAAP?
Evidence from SFAS 123R

1. Introduction
Even though Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) define the measure of
earnings included in mandatory disclosures and filings with the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the use of earnings measures that do not conform to GAAP by managers and
analysts has increased in recent years. Many firms present and refer to measures of earnings that
exclude some earnings components, popularly referred to as “pro forma earnings.” Similarly,
analysts are not constrained in the definition of earnings that they forecast, and the definition of
forecasted earnings, popularly referred to as “Street earnings,” often varies across firms and
analysts. The prevalence and increasing use of these non-GAAP earnings measures are of
concern to securities market regulators.1 Reflecting this concern, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 contains provisions related to firms’ use of non-GAAP earnings in their earnings
announcements. In particular, Section 401(b) of the Act required the SEC to issue rules
requiring firms to reconcile any non-GAAP financial measure to the most directly comparable
GAAP financial measure. Regulation G, put into effect by the SEC in 2003, now governs firms’
disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures, such as pro forma earnings.
This paper seeks to provide evidence on reasons for exclusions from pro forma and Street
earnings, with particular emphasis on the properties of the excluded items and any differences
between analysts and managers’ reasons for exclusion. We address these questions in the
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The SEC describes the concern as relating to “the improper use of non-GAAP financial measures during the past
30 years.” Former SEC Chief Accountant Turner, stated “people use these ‘pro-forma’ press releases as a vehicle to
spin the investors” (Turner, as quoted in Stamas, “SEC looks into firms’ earnings releases ‘Pro-forma’ figures may
mislead investors,” The Seattle Times, June 19, 2001). More recently, the SEC has referred to pro forma earnings as
a fraud risk factor (Leone, “What’s on the SEC’s Radar?” CFO.com, September 29, 2010).
1
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context of the recent change in the definition of GAAP earnings related to stock-based
compensation expense. We focus on this setting for a number of reasons. First, stock-based
compensation expense is clearly a recurring item, which makes it possible for analysts to exclude
it from forecasts ex ante, i.e., prior to observing realized earnings. Second, there is substantial
disagreement between analysts and managers on whether stock-based compensation expense
should be excluded—analysts only exclude it in 27% of cases in which managers exclude it,
which makes it a powerful setting in which to examine differences in the reasons for exclusion
from Street and pro forma earnings. Finally, because stock-based compensation expense was
disclosed prior to recognition, we are able to estimate properties of the expense independent of
the decision to exclude it.
In addition, accounting for stock-based compensation is one of the most controversial
topics ever addressed by accounting standard setters. In 1995, despite its unanimous view that
the expense should be recognized, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) yielded to
political pressure in making recognition voluntary in Statement of Financial Accounting
Standard No. 123 (FASB, 1995). In light of the accounting scandals of 2001 and 2002 and the
International Accounting Standards Board’s then-recent decision to require expense recognition
for firms applying its standards, in 2004 the FASB issued SFAS 123R (FASB, 2004), which
requires recognition of stock-based compensation expense beginning in 2006.2 However, SFAS
123R faced resistance similar to that encountered by SFAS 123, suggesting that, despite the
FASB’s conceptual arguments, many still disagree with recognition of stock-based compensation
expense. Consistent with ongoing controversy, for some firms, managers present measures of

2

Throughout, stock-based compensation expense refers to the portion of stock-based compensation expense that
was not required to be recognized prior to the issuance of SFAS 123R. This expense relates primarily to at-themoney stock options granted to employees.
2

net income in earnings announcements (pro forma earnings) that exclude stock-based
compensation expense and, for some firms, analyst consensus earnings forecasts (Street
earnings) exclude the expense. In addition, for a given firm, managers and analysts do not
always treat the expense in the same way.
We test two explanations identified in prior research for exclusion of expenses from pro
forma and Street earnings. The first, which we label the “opportunism” explanation, is that
exclusion is motivated by the desire to manage investors’ perceptions of firm performance. The
second, which we label the “predictive ability” explanation, is that excluded items are not useful
in predicting future firm performance and, thus, excluding them results in an earnings measure
that is more useful for predicting future firm performance.
We expect that opportunism is more likely to explain managers’ exclusion of stock-based
compensation expense from pro forma earnings, and that predictive ability is less likely to
explain this exclusion. As noted above, Regulation G is evidence of concerns of the SEC that
firms use pro forma earnings to manage investors’ perceptions about the firm. Thus, we expect
that managing investors’ perceptions is the primary motivation for managers’ exclusion
decisions.
We expect that both opportunism and predictive ability explain analysts’ exclusion of
stock-based compensation expense from Street earnings. However, drawing on prior research,
we predict that that opportunism explanation primarily reflects the incentives of managers and
conjecture that, once the exclusion decisions of managers are controlled for, opportunism does
not incrementally explain exclusion by analysts.
We conduct our tests using a sample comprising all firms with required data in industries
with at least one firm whose consensus analyst earnings forecast for 2006, the first year expense
3

recognition was required by SFAS 123R, excludes stock-based compensation expense. We refer
to firms with stock-based compensation expense excluded from (included in) 2006 Street
earnings as Street Excluders (Street Includers), and firms with the expense excluded from
(included in) 2006 pro forma earnings as Pro Forma Excluders (Pro Forma Includers).
To test the opportunism explanation, we test whether incentives to increase earnings,
smooth earnings, and meet earnings benchmarks explain whether a firm is a Pro Forma Includer
or Excluder and whether a firm is a Street Excluder or Includer. To allow for the possibility that
Street earnings exclusion is explained by analysts following the pro forma exclusion or inclusion
decision of managers, or vice versa, in the Street earnings relation we also control for whether
the expense was excluded from pro forma earnings, and in the pro forma earnings relation we
control for whether the expense was excluded from Street earnings. Because we expect that
opportunism is more likely to explain pro forma exclusion and less likely to explain Street
exclusion, we expect opportunism to explain pro forma exclusion incrementally to Street
exclusion, but do not expect opportunism to explain Street earnings exclusion incrementally to
pro forma exclusion.
We test the predictive ability explanation in two ways, both using data from years that
predate the expense recognition requirements of SFAS 123R, which ensures that the estimated
predictive ability is not influenced by the exclusion decision. First, we test which earnings
measure better predicts future earnings, a measure that excludes stock-based compensation
expense or a measure that includes it. We conduct this test separately for four groups of firms,
Pro Forma Excluders, Pro Forma Includers, Street Excluders, and Street Includers. We expect
that the earnings measure that excludes (includes) stock-based compensation expense has more
predictive ability for Street Excluders (Street Includers). However, we do not expect that the
4

earnings measure that excludes (includes) stock-based compensation expense has more
predictive ability for Pro Forma Excluders (Pro Forma Includers). Second, we estimate the
relation between stock-based compensation expense and future earnings, permitting the relation
to differ for Street Excluders and Includers. We expect stock-based compensation expense to be
significantly related to future earnings for Street Includers, and that this relation is significantly
attenuated or absent for Street Excluders. We estimate the same relation for Pro Forma
Excluders and Includers, but expect no difference in the relation for these two groups of firms.
The findings are consistent with our predictions. Regarding pro forma earnings, we find
support for the opportunism explanation and no support for the predictive ability explanation. In
particular, we find that incentives to increase earnings, meet earnings benchmarks, and smooth
earnings explain pro forma exclusion of stock-based compensation expense. We do not find that
pro forma exclusion is associated with greater predictive ability. In fact, we find the opposite—
earnings that includes (excludes) stock-based compensation expense has significantly greater
predictive ability for firms whose pro forma earnings excludes (includes) the expense.
Regarding Street earnings, we find support for the predictive ability explanation, but limited
support for the opportunism explanation. In particular, we find that earnings that excludes
(includes) stock-based compensation expense has significantly greater predictive ability for firms
whose Street earnings excludes (includes) the expense. Although we also find that incentives to
increase earnings, meet earnings benchmarks, and smooth earnings explain Street exclusion
unconditionally, their associations generally are not significant after controlling for exclusion
from pro forma earnings. These findings suggest that analysts are concerned with managing
investor perceptions of firm performance only to the extent that management is. The
opportunism explanation does not explain exclusion by analysts incremental to exclusion by
5

managers.
Additional analyses indicate that our (i) predictive ability findings are not attributable to
an association between predictive ability and opportunism, and are robust to measuring future
firm performance using cash from operations; (ii) inferences apply to firms in both the computer
industry—which includes many of the Street Excluders in our sample—and non-computer
industries; (iii) inferences are robust to using an alternative source to identify Street Excluders;
and (iv) findings are not attributable to modifications in stock option plans in anticipation of
mandatory recognition of stock-based compensation expense.
We contribute to the literature on non-GAAP earnings by showing that different
incentives explain exclusion of an earnings component from pro forma earnings and Street
earnings. Also, ours is the first study to test whether the predictive ability for future performance
of a particular earnings component differs for firms whose managers (analysts) exclude it from
pro forma (Street) earnings and for firms whose managers (analysts) include it. A key
distinguishing feature of our study that permits these contributions is that we focus on a change
in the definition of GAAP earnings. This enables us to test our predictions using a sample that
includes not only firms whose managers and analysts exclude stock-based compensation expense
from pro forma and Street earnings, but also firms whose managers and analysts include the
expense. That is, we observe stock-based compensation expense regardless of the exclusion
decision, whereas prior research examines the properties of special items defined as items that
are excluded from pro forma or Street earnings. Prior research compares the predictive ability
of, and to a more limited extent incentives related to, excluded earnings components with that of
other, potentially quite different, included earnings components using samples comprising only
firms that have excluded a component from one or both measures.
6

We contribute to the literature on accounting for stock-based compensation by showing
that stock-based compensation expense does not have the same predictive ability for future
performance for all firms. Also, we provide insight into how key market participants respond to
changes in GAAP. Our findings suggest that, regardless of the correctness of recognizing stockbased compensation expense from the standpoint of the FASB’s conceptual framework, analysts
ignore a change in GAAP when doing so yields an earnings measure that better predicts future
firm performance. We find no evidence that managers do the same when determining pro forma
earnings; rather, the findings reveal managers respond to incentives to increase earnings, smooth
earnings, and meet earnings benchmarks. Our findings suggest the controversy surrounding
recognition of stock-based compensation expense may be attributable to cross-sectional variation
in the relevance of the expense for equity valuation, as well as to differing incentives of key
market participants.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 provide institutional
background and discuss related research on accounting for stock-based compensation, and pro
forma and Street earnings. Section 4 develops our predictions and research design. Section 5
describes the sample and data, and section 6 presents the results. Section 7 concludes.

2. Accounting for Stock-based Compensation
2.1.

Institutional background
Accounting for stock-based compensation is one of the most controversial topics ever

addressed by accounting standard setters. Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 25 (APB
25; 1973) was the initial standard specifying how to account for stock options granted to
employees as compensation. APB 25, which predates Black and Scholes (1973), required firms
7

to measure the expense as the difference between the stock price and the option exercise price on
the grant date. This amount equals zero for most employee options. In 1984, the FASB added a
project to its agenda to improve the requirements in APB 25. That project resulted in the FASB
issuing an exposure draft in 1993 proposing that firms measure the expense based on the options’
grant date value. The exposure draft met with fierce resistance by firms, and the U.S. Congress
held hearings on whether the FASB should be permitted to finalize the standard with the
proposed measurement requirement.
In 1995 the FASB issued SFAS 123 (FASB, 1995). Although SFAS 123 recommended
measurement of the expense using the grant date value approach, it permitted firms to recognize
the expense using the measurement approach of APB 25 and only disclose what net income
would have been had the expense been measured using the grant date value approach. The Basis
for Conclusions of SFAS 123 (FASB, 1995, ¶57–62) explains that even though the FASB was
unanimous in its view that expense recognition based on grant date values was proper
accounting, the FASB did not require expense recognition because the controversy was so severe
that doing so would have threatened accounting standard setting in the private sector.
Almost all firms applied the measurement approach of APB 25 until the summer of 2002,
when a small number of firms adopted the grant date value approach (Aboody, Barth, and
Kasznik, 2004b; Brown and Lee, 2006). In light of the financial reporting failures of 2001, the
FASB revisited accounting for stock-based compensation and, in 2004, the FASB issued SFAS
123R (FASB, 2004), which took effect for fiscal years beginning on or after June 15, 2005. The
primary effect of SFAS 123R was to require recognition of stock-based compensation expense
using the grant date value measurement approach. Despite the apparent resolution in SFAS
123R, the controversy continues. Several prominent persons, including three Nobel Laureates
8

and former U.S. Secretaries of State and the Treasury, recently reiterated arguments that
recognizing the expense is improper because the value of employee stock options does not
represent an expense of the firm (Hagopian, 2006), and filed a petition with the SEC in 2008
alleging that the SEC failed in its duties by permitting the FASB to issue SFAS 123R.3
2.2. Related stock-based compensation research
Our study relates to two streams of literature on the accounting for stock-based
compensation. This first is the literature that examines actions taken in anticipation of or in
response to the FASB’s requirement to recognize stock-based compensation expense. Aboody,
Barth, and Kasznik (2004b) finds that firms voluntarily recognize the expense in 2002 and early
2003 to signal greater financial reporting transparency.4 Relating to non-accounting actions that
reduce the income effect of mandated expense recognition, Carter and Lynch (2003) finds that
firms manage the timing of option repricings, Choudhary, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2009)
finds that some firms accelerated vesting of employee options, and Brown and Lee (2006) and
Johnston and Rock (2006) find that firms reduce their use of option-based compensation. We
contribute to this literature by examining financial reporting actions taken by key market
participants—managers and analysts—in response to SFAS 123R.
The second is the literature linking stock-based compensation expense and firm
fundamentals. Aboody (1996) and Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik (ABK, 2004a) find a significant
negative relation between changes in unrecognized stock-based compensation expense and stock

3

“Petition for Review and Repeal of FAS 123R, ‘Share-Based Payment’” filed with the SEC by opponents of SFAS
123R on February 27, 2008.
4
Consistent with similar motivations for voluntary expense recognition and inclusion of the expense in earnings
forecasts, stock-based compensation expense is included in consensus forecasts of all firms McConnell et al. (2003)
identifies as voluntarily recognizing the expense. As section 5 explains, we exclude from our sample all firms that
voluntarily recognized the expense. We are unaware of any of firms that included unrecognized stock-based
compensation expense in pro forma earnings prior to 2006.
9

returns. Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2003) finds a significant positive relation between
stock-based compensation expense for the firm’s top five executives and future operating
earnings, although the sign of the relation depends on the specification (Larcker, 2003).
However, prior research does not examine cross-sectional variation in the predictive ability of
stock-based compensation expense for firm fundamentals, which could be one source of the
continuing debate about accounting for stock-based compensation. For example, firms for which
stock-based compensation expense has no predictive ability might question whether the expense
should be a component of earnings, whereas firms for which the expense has predictive ability
might not. We contribute to this literature by investigating whether the predictive ability of
stock-based compensation expense differs for firms whose pro forma earnings excludes and
includes the expense, and for firms whose Street earnings excludes and includes the expense.
3. Pro Forma and Street Earnings
3.1. Institutional background
Many firms present “pro forma” measures of net income in earnings announcements that
exclude some earnings components, typically expenses. The prevalence of these non-GAAP
earnings measures has increased in recent years, causing concern among securities market
regulators. Reflecting this concern, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 contains provisions related
to firms’ use of non-GAAP earnings. In particular, Section 401(b) of the Act requires the SEC to
issue rules requiring firms to reconcile a disclosed non-GAAP financial measure to the most
directly comparable GAAP financial measure. The SEC put this requirement into effect in
Regulation G (effective March 28, 2003). Pro forma earnings (earnings per share) is a nonGAAP measure for which earnings (earnings per share) is the most directly comparable GAAP
measure. Stock-based compensation expense is an example of an earnings component that firms
10

exclude from pro forma earnings.
“Street earnings” refers to earnings forecasts or actual earnings as tracked by major data
services that collect and aggregate analyst forecasts, such as First Call-I/B/E/S.5 These data
services do not prescribe which items are to be included in or excluded from forecasted earnings
(Jones, 2006). Rather, analysts covering the firm collectively determine the definition of a firm’s
Street earnings. In particular, for an analyst’s earnings forecast to be included in the consensus
calculation, the forecast must be calculated on the same basis as that used by the majority of
analysts issuing forecasts for the firm (First Call, 1999; Lambert, 2004). Consistent with this
policy, the consensus earnings forecast of a firm on First Call-I/B/E/S includes or excludes
stock-based compensation expense depending on how the expense is treated in the forecasts of
the majority of analysts covering the firm.6
Consistent with prior research, we refer to differences between GAAP earnings and either
pro forma earnings or Street earnings as “exclusions” because the differences typically represent
components of GAAP earnings excluded from pro forma earnings or Street earnings.
3.2. Related pro forma and Street earnings research
A large literature addresses differences between GAAP earnings and Street or pro forma
earnings. Earlier studies in this literature focus on the association between pro forma or Street
5

I/B/E/S and First Call are data services of Thomson Financial that similarly treat actual earnings and analyst
earnings forecasts. Thus, we refer to them collectively as First Call-I/B/E/S except when discussing our data
sources; First Call and I/B/E/S maintain separate databases. All data used in this study are taken from the I/B/E/S
historical research database, with exception of footnote data, which are taken from the First Call database.
6
Consistent with this, Zacks, another supplier of analyst earnings forecasts, includes stock-based compensation
expense in all forecasts in its database; if the forecast submitted by the analyst excludes the expense, Zacks adjusts
the forecast to include it. See, Wall Street Journal Online, Options Expensing Jars Consensus, April 4, 2006.
Because stock-based compensation expense is not a “special” or transitory item, the forecast data provider can more
readily determine whether stock-based compensation expense is included in a particular analyst’s forecast made
prior to observing actual earnings. This determination is more difficult for special or transitory items examined in
prior research. This is because these items, almost by definition, should have an expectation of zero, which means
there is no practical difference between forecasting the item to be zero and excluding the item from the forecast.
Thus, such items are only meaningfully excluded after actual earnings are observed.
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earnings and stock returns. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) finds that pro forma and Street earnings
both are more highly associated with earnings announcement returns than is operating earnings
as defined by Standard and Poor’s (S&P). Lougee and Marquardt (2004) also finds that pro
forma earnings is more highly associated with earnings announcement stock returns than is
GAAP earnings in some circumstances, but finds mixed evidence regarding the predictive ability
of pro forma earnings for future profitability and future returns. Bradshaw and Sloan (2002)
finds that the explanatory power of Street earnings for stock returns is greater than that of GAAP
earnings after 1992, when differences between GAAP and Street earnings became more
prevalent.7 Consistent with these findings, Brown and Sivakumar (2003) finds that Street
earnings is more highly associated with stock price and three- and sixty-three day returns than is
S&P operating earnings.8
A limitation of studies examining stock returns is that a motivation for firms to use pro
forma earnings is to manage investors’ perceptions about the firm and, thus, it is possible
investors are misled by pro forma earnings (e.g., Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman, 2003). Lougee
and Marquardt (2004) explains that firms strategically exclude items from pro forma earnings to
influence investors’ perceptions of the earnings news. As a result, returns reflect investors’
reactions to firms’ strategic exclusion behavior as well as the predictive ability of the excluded
items, which confounds inferences obtained from stock return tests. Thus, some studies, as does
ours, instead test whether an excluded item has predictive ability for future firm performance.
For example, Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman (2003) finds that exclusions from Street earnings
7

However, Cohen, Hann, and Ogneva (2007) finds that the increased explanatory power of Street earnings is
attributable to measurement error in earnings surprises.
8
Brown and Sivakumar (2003) observes that comparing GAAP earnings and Street earnings biases in favor of Street
earnings because GAAP earnings is not designed to measure recurring operating earnings, which is more the
motivation for Street earnings. Because operating earnings is not defined by GAAP, as does Bhattacharya et al.
(2003), Brown and Sivakumar (2003) studies operating earnings as defined by S&P.
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have significant predictive ability for future operating cash flows and earnings, but their
predictive ability is less than that of GAAP earnings.9
A few studies examine how pro forma and Street earnings differ from each other. Gu and
Chen (2004) compares the predictive ability of items excluded from both pro forma and Street
earnings with that of items excluded from pro forma earnings but included in Street earnings.
Gu and Chen (2004) finds that both types of pro forma exclusions have predictive ability for
future operating cash flows and earnings, but the relations are weaker for items excluded from
both pro forma and Street earnings. Baik, Farber, and Petroni (2009) adopts the approach in Gu
and Chen (2004) and tests for cross-sectional differences in the predictive ability of items
excluded from both pro forma and Street earnings. Baik, Farber, and Petroni (2009) finds that
such expense exclusions help predict future earnings for glamour firms, but not for value firms,
and infers that analysts’ incentives influence Street earnings, which leads to Street earnings that
are less useful in predicting future earnings for glamour stocks.10 Both studies examine how
analysts respond to firms’ exclusions from pro forma earnings, i.e., they study exclusions from
Street earnings conditional on the item being excluded from pro forma earnings. They do not
seek to test what explains the pro forma exclusion.11
We contribute to this literature by testing whether the predictive ability of a particular
9
Landsman, Miller, and Yeh (2007) obtains similar inferences using tests of predictive ability based on the Ohlson
(1995, 1999) valuation model.
10
A large portion of firms in our sample with stock-based compensation expense excluded from Street earnings are
in the computer industry. Such firms might be considered glamour firms. The glamour firm findings in Baik,
Farber, and Petroni (2009) suggest that excluded stock-based compensation expense would have predictive ability
for these firms. We find the opposite, which suggests that our findings are not explained by the glamour firm effect
in Baik, Farber, and Petroni (2009).
11
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) uses firms’ earnings response coefficients and corresponding R2s to explain the
likelihood that a firm subsequently reports pro forma earnings. However, as in other related research, Lougee and
Marquardt (2004) compares predictive ability only for firms with pro forma exclusions and does not consider
whether cross-sectional differences in an item’s predictive ability explain its exclusion. Curtis et al. (2011) tests the
opportunism and predictive ability explanations for net positive special items by confirming that the items have less
predictive ability for future operating earnings than past operating earnings and documenting no association between
the items and earnings announcement returns.
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item—stock-based compensation expense— differs for firms whose analysts include it in Street
earnings and for firms whose analysts exclude it, and we do the same for pro forma earnings.
Also, we test the extent to which the predictive ability and opportunism explanations explain pro
forma and Street exclusions. We provide evidence that different incentives explain exclusion of
an earnings component from these two earnings measures—we find that opportunism explains
exclusion from pro forma earnings and predictive ability explains exclusion from Street earnings.
4. Empirical Predictions and Research Design
4.1. Opportunism and predictive ability
Prior literature (e.g., Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman, 2003) and the concerns of Congress
and the SEC leading up to promulgation of Regulation G suggest two explanations for exclusion
of an earnings component from pro forma or Street earnings. The opportunism explanation
predicts managers and analysts opportunistically exclude components of earnings from pro
forma or Street earnings, i.e., exclude components when doing so helps firms to meet
benchmarks or has a positive effect on valuation metrics, such as earnings. The predictive ability
explanation predicts managers and analysts exclude earnings components that are less predictive
of future firm performance.
One issue in developing separate empirical predictions for Street and pro forma earnings
based on prior research is that much of this research has generally either not sought, or has not
been able, to distinguish the roles of managers and analysts in exclusion decisions. Nonetheless,
we believe that prior research provides evidence suggesting that opportunism is the primary
explanation for pro forma exclusion and predictive ability is the primary explanation for Street
exclusion. This evidence is consistent with investors’ perceptions of firm performance being of
greater concern to managers than to analysts, and with analysts being more concerned than
14

managers about predicting firm performance.
Regarding pro forma earnings, evidence from prior research and regulatory actions
suggests that opportunism is the primary explanation for exclusion. Recent regulatory changes,
e.g., Regulation G, are aimed at addressing concerns of the SEC that firms use pro forma
earnings to manage investors’ perceptions about the firm. Similarly, there is considerable
evidence of managers acting opportunistically in determining pro forma earnings (Doyle,
Lundholm, and Soliman, 2003; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; McVay, 2006; Brown et al., 2011),
but relatively little evidence of managers’ choices reflecting predictive ability. Studies that find
evidence of managers’ exclusion decisions reflecting predictive ability (or similar notions, such
as value relevance) often do so in settings in which it is difficult to rule out opportunism as an
alternative explanation. For example, consistent with a predictive ability explanation, Lougee
and Marquardt (2004) finds that firms with low GAAP earnings informativeness are more likely
to disclose pro forma earnings. However, Lougee and Marquardt (2003) also finds that firms
with more informative GAAP earnings exclude items that do not have predictive ability, and that
opportunism has more explanatory power than earnings informativeness. Also consistent with a
predictive ability explanation, Blacconiere et al. (2010) suggests that managers’ disavowal of the
measurement of stock-based compensation expense reflects legitimate concerns about the
reliability of value estimates, and finds limited evidence of opportunism. Riedl and Srinivasan
(2010) finds evidence that the presentation of special items on the income statement or in the
footnotes is affected by the predictive ability of the item, but prior research suggests that even
the identification of an item as “special” often reflects opportunistic motivations (Riedl, 2004).
With regard to Street earnings, we expect that both opportunism and predictive ability
explain analysts’ exclusion of stock-based compensation expense. However, we predict that the
15

opportunism explanation primarily reflects the incentives of managers and that, once the
exclusion decisions of managers are controlled for, opportunism has either no role, or a
diminished role, in explaining exclusion by analysts. Consistent with the predictive ability
explanation, prior research (discussed in section 3.2) finds that items excluded from Street
earnings have less predictive ability for firm fundamentals than either GAAP earnings or
earnings components that are excluded from pro forma earnings, but included in Street earnings
(Gu and Chen 2004). These findings are consistent with predictive ability explaining Street
exclusion to a greater extent than pro forma exclusion. Baik, Farber, and Petroni (2009), one of
the few studies that examines the opportunism explanation for exclusions by analysts, identifies
optimism “in order to generate more investment banking business” (p. 50) as one of the key
motivations for opportunistic exclusion by analysts. However, consistent with a diminished role
for opportunism in explaining analyst exclusion incremental to manager exclusion, Christensen
et al. (2011) shows that managers exclude recurring earnings components, such as stock-based
compensation expense, in an attempt to influence analysts to exclude the components. To the
extent that opportunism is the primary motivation for exclusions by managers and not by
analysts, we expect that, after controlling for exclusion by managers, opportunism has little or no
incremental explanatory power for Street exclusion.
4.2. Opportunism
To test the opportunism explanation, we estimate two versions of equation (1) using
probit regression.
EX = β0 + β1 COMPXA + β2 IPOSSURP + β3 ILOSS + β4 σ(COMPXA) + β5 σ(AF)
+ β6 ANALYSTS + β7 INSTIT + β8 POLICY + β9 ROA + β10 SIZE + ε
In the first (second) version, EX is EX_PROFORMA (EX_STREET), where EX_PROFORMA
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(1)

(EX_STREET) is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s pro forma (Street) earnings
for fiscal 2006 excludes stock-based compensation expense, and zero otherwise. We label firms
with EX_PROFORMA equal to one (zero) as Pro Forma Excluders (Pro Forma Includers), and
firms with EX_STREET equal to one (zero) as Street Excluders (Street Includers).
To estimate equation (1) we use 2005 amounts because these are the most recent data
available prior to issuance of 2006 earnings forecasts. As a result, all variables in equation (1)
predate the effective date of SFAS 123R and the consequent decision of whether analyst
forecasts or firms’ pro forma earnings include or exclude stock-based compensation expense.
For reasons explained below, we expect β1, β2, β3, and β4 are positive and β8 is negative in both
versions of equation (1); we have no expectation regarding the signs of β5, β6, β7, β9, and β10.
The first four explanatory variables in equation (1) are proxies for incentives to exclude
stock-based compensation expense from pro forma earnings. COMPXA is stock-based
compensation expense, COMPX, deflated by beginning of year total assets.12 We expect that
firms with higher stock-based compensation expense are more likely to exclude the expense
from pro forma earnings because the effect of exclusion on related valuation metrics is greater
when the expense is higher. IPOSSURP is an indicator variable that equals one if actual earnings
per I/B/E/S minus the last consensus earnings forecast before the firm’s fiscal 2005 year-end is
positive, and zero otherwise. Based on Kasznik and McNichols (2002), we expect firms that
have met earnings benchmarks in the past have a greater incentive to do so in the future and,
thus, expect a positive relation between IPOSSURP and exclusion of stock-based compensation
expense.
12

For a few firms we confirmed that Compustat data #399, our measure of COMPX, is the difference, per share,
between GAAP net income and what net income would have been had stock-based compensation expense been
measured using the grant date value measurement approach disclosed under SFAS 123. COMPX reflects the
amount by which earnings that excludes the expense is higher than earnings that includes it.
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ILOSS is an indicator variable that equals one if excluding stock-based compensation
expense results in the firm avoiding a loss, i.e., NI – COMPX < 0 < NI, where NI is actual
earnings as reported by I/B/E/S, and zero otherwise. Because Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)
posits that avoidance of a loss increases firm value, we expect a firm is more likely to exclude
stock-based compensation expense from pro forma earnings when a firm reports positive
earnings only if stock-based compensation expense is excluded. σ(COMPXA) is the standard
deviation of a firm’s COMPXA across sample years.13 We expect that managers’ desire for
smoother earnings leads to a higher likelihood of exclusion when the volatility of a firm’s stockbased compensation expense is greater and, thus, expect a positive relation between σ(COMPXA)
and exclusion of the expense.14,15
Our incentive variables relate not only to managers, but also to analysts. Prior research
suggests analysts have incentives to exclude an expense from Street earnings when managers
have incentives to exclude it from pro forma earnings because, for example, analysts desire to
curry favor with the firm to obtain investment banking business (Francis and Philbrick, 1993;
Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki,
2004). Managers also may influence analysts’ exclusions through earnings guidance
(Christensen et al., 2011). Thus, managers’ incentives can also explain exclusions from Street
earnings. We also expect analysts to have their own incentives to avoid earnings surprises,
13

Untabulated tests reveal that our inferences are unaffected if we use the variability of net income minus stockbased compensation expense instead of σ(COMPXA).
14
This is consistent with the statement by TIBCO Software Inc. in its December 21, 2006 8-K, explaining its
exclusion of stock-based compensation from pro forma earnings: “the nature of the stock-based compensation
expense also makes it very difficult to estimate prospectively, since the expense will vary with changes in the stock
price and market conditions at the time of new grants, varying valuation methodologies, subjective assumptions and
different award types.”
15
These variables also could identify situations in which investors would like more information about stock-based
compensation expense and managers oblige. However, firms could provide such information without using pro
forma earnings, as regulated by Reg G, that excludes stock-based compensation expense, which is how we define
EX_PROFORMA. See footnote 26.
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relative to their forecasts, and having to predict a difficult-to-predict earnings component, i.e.,
one with greater variance (Lambert, 2004). Even though our incentive variables relate to
managers and analysts, how the incentives relate to managers’ and analysts’ exclusion of stockbased compensation expense likely differs. Estimating equation (1) separately for the two types
of exclusions permits the relations to differ.
The next three variables in equation (1) are proxies for information asymmetry. We
include them because it is possible that information asymmetry affects incentives of both
managers and analysts to exclude stock-based compensation expense. Based on prior literature,
the proxies are: σ(AF), the standard deviation of a firm’s analyst forecasts of earnings deflated by
total assets, measured one year prior to fiscal year-end; ANALYSTS, the number of analysts
providing earnings forecasts for the firm; and INSTIT, the percentage of shares outstanding held
by institutional investors as reported on Form 13-F.
We also include in equation (1) POLICY, which is an indicator variable that equals one if
the firm is covered by at least one of seven large brokerage firms that the popular press reports
require their analysts to include stock-based compensation expense in their earnings forecasts,
and zero otherwise.16 We expect that firms covered by these brokerage firms are less likely to
have the expense excluded. We also include in equation (1) ROA and SIZE as control variables,
where ROA is the ratio of actual earnings as reported by I/B/E/S to beginning of year total assets
and SIZE is the natural logarithm of end of year market value of equity, as well as industry fixed
effects.17
16

These firms are Bank of America, Bear Stearns, Credit Suisse First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch,
Sanford C. Bernstein, and UBS. See, e.g. Taub, S. “Staggered start for options expensing.” CFO.com. June 1, 2005
and “Stock options: So who’s counting,” New York Times, nytimes.com, August 6, 2005. Our inferences are
unaffected if POLICY equals one if a majority of the brokers following the firm have a policy to include the
expense, or if we eliminate firms for which a majority of brokers following the firm have such a policy.
17
Our inferences are unaffected if we define SIZE as the natural logarithm of total assets.
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4.3. Predictive ability
We conduct two sets of tests of the predictive ability explanation for exclusion of stockbased compensation expense from pro forma or Street earnings. In the first set, we focus on
differences in the predictive ability for future earnings of earnings measures that exclude and
include the expense, and whether those differences support the exclusion or inclusion decisions
by managers and analysts.18 In particular, we compare the explanatory powers from equations
(2) and (3) for Pro Forma Excluders and Includers and for Street Excluders and Includers.
EARNt+1 = α0 + α1 EARNt + α2 SIZEt + α3 BMt + εt
EARNt+1 = α0 + α1 (EARNt – COMPXAt) + α2 SIZEt + α3 BMt + εt

(2)
(3)

EARN is net income before extraordinary items deflated by beginning of year total assets, and t
denotes year. BM is the end of year equity book to market ratio.
Equation (2) does not include stock-based compensation expense as a potential predictor
of future earnings, but equation (3) does. Because we do not expect the predictive ability of
stock-based compensation expense to explain exclusion of the expense from pro forma earnings,
we expect that equation (2) ((3)) has no greater explanatory power for Pro Forma Excluders
(Includers) than does equation (3) ((2)).19 In contrast, because we expect the predictive ability of
stock-based compensation expense to explain exclusion of the expense from Street earnings, we
expect that equation (2) has more (less) explanatory power than equation (3) for Street Excluders
(Includers).
An important feature of our research design is that in all of our predictive ability tests the
18

We test for differences in predictive ability for future earnings. However, untabulated findings from tests for
differences in predictive ability for future cash from operations reveal the same inferences.
19
Our tests of significance are based on a non-parametric goodness of fit test because Clarke (2003, 2007) shows the
test is superior to the Vuong (1989) test when the sets of explanatory variables are highly correlated, as they are in
our setting.
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latest year of data we use is 2005, i.e., the relations we estimate predate the effective date of
SFAS 123R. This feature ensures that none of the variables in equations (2) through (5) reflects
stock-based compensation expense, thereby ruling out the possibility of a mechanical relation
between the variables that is attributable to recognized stock-based compensation expense.20
This research design feature also ensures that our inferences are not confounded by the
possibility that the predictive ability of the expense, or a firm’s use of stock-based compensation
post SFAS 123R, is caused by exclusion. We include year and industry fixed effects in
equations (2) through (5) and calculate t-statistics using standard errors clustered by firm and by
year (Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 2010).21
Our second set of tests relating to the predictive ability explanation focuses on
differences in predictive ability of stock-based compensation expense for future earnings. Our
tests are adapted from prior research that tests for differences in the predictive abilities of GAAP
earnings and exclusions (e.g., Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman, 2003). In particular, we estimate
equation (4).
EARNt+1 = α0 + α1 EARNt + α2 COMPXAt + φ0 EX + φ1 EX*COMPXAt
+ α3 SIZEt + α4 BMt + εt

(4)

We expect that for Street Excluders stock-based compensation expense has less predictive ability
for future earnings than for Street Includers. Thus, for EX = EX_STREET, we expect φ1 differs
significantly from zero in a way that evidences less predictive ability of COMPXA than does α2,
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For example, in equation (2) if earnings, EARN, were based on net income that included stock-based
compensation expense, we could find a significant negative relation between EARNt+1 and COMPXAt solely because
higher expense is associated with lower net income. By basing EARN on net income prior to the recognition of
stock-based compensation expense, we rule out this possibility.
21
When estimating all of our equations, we eliminate outliers. Following Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) we
classify outliers as those observations with studentized residuals greater than three in absolute value. All inferences
are unaffected by the inclusion of outliers.
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or even that α2 + φ1 is not significantly different from zero. We do not expect the predictive
ability of stock-based compensation expense to differ for Pro Forma Excluders and Pro Forma
Includers. Thus, for EX = EX_PROFORMA, we expect φ1 is not significantly different from
zero.
To allow for the possibility that time-invariant cross-sectional differences between firms
whose consensus forecasts exclude and include stock-based compensation expense, i.e.,
correlated omitted variables, confound our inferences, we also estimate a version of equation (4)
using changes in earnings (Christie, 1987; Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995). In particular, we
estimate equation (5).

∆EARNt+1 = α0 + α1 ∆EARNt + α2 ∆COMPXAt + φ0 EX + φ1 EX*∆COMPXAt
+ α3 SIZEt + α4 BMt + εt
where ∆ denotes annual change.22 As with equation (4), when EX = EX_STREET, we expect φ1
differs significantly from zero in a way that evidences less predictive ability of ∆COMPXA than
does α2, or even that α2 + φ1 is not significantly different from zero; when EX =
EX_PROFORMA, we expect φ1 is not significantly different from zero.
To the extent that analysts exclude stock-based compensation expense for reasons other
than differences in predictive ability, our ability to detect differences for Street Includers and
Street Excluders in equations (2) through (5) will be diminished. For example, if analysts
exclude the expense because they are currying favor with managers or are following managers’
lead and managers’ exclusions are unrelated to predictive ability, then the power of our tests to
find that predictive ability explains Street exclusion will be lower.
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We also estimated equations (4) and (5) including EX*EARNt and EX*∆EARNt, respectively, with no change in
our inferences.
22

(5)

5. Sample, Data, and Descriptive Statistics
To construct our sample, we first identify Street Excluders as those firms Bear Stearns
U.S. Equity Research lists as having stock-based compensation expense excluded from their
consensus analyst forecast of 2006 earnings (Senyek et al., 2007). Bear Stearns considered firms
in the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ 100, as well as other firms with a large difference between
earnings as determined by GAAP and as reported by First Call. For these firms, Bear Stearns
reviewed the First Call footnotes or notation for whether the consensus earnings forecast
included or excluded stock-based compensation expense. As an additional check, Bear Stearns
reviewed press releases and company filings to verify the difference between GAAP earnings
and earnings as reported by First Call. Bear Stearns lists 102 firms whose consensus forecast of
2006 earnings excludes stock-based compensation expense—38 from the S&P 500, 32 from the
NASDAQ 100, and 55 firms in neither index; 98 of these meet our data requirements.23 We then
identify Street Includers as firms that are in the same industry as at least one Street Excluder,
using the Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1998) industry definitions.
To be included in our sample, we require firms to have data necessary to estimate
equation (1) and at least one year of data to estimate equations (2) through (5). Thus, sample
firms must have (i) non-negative 2005 stock-based compensation expense, COMPX; (ii) a
consensus forecast of 2005 earnings, which is the latest consensus forecast prior to the end of the
23

Some related research (e.g., Gu and Chen, 2004; Baik, Farber, and Petroni, 2009) uses the First Call footnote file
to determine whether analyst forecasts exclude an earnings component. We use the Bear Stearns list because of the
additional analysis performed by Bear Stearns to verify whether the First Call footnotes were correct with respect to
the exclusion of stock-based compensation expense. Also, we identified three types of errors in the footnote file.
First, not all firms have footnotes indicating whether stock-based compensation expense is included in or excluded
from the forecast. For example, there is no footnote related to stock-based compensation expense for Google’s 2006
earnings forecast, but we confirmed that stock-based compensation expense is excluded from the forecast as the
Bear Stearns list indicates. Second, some firms have multiple footnotes that conflict as to whether the forecast
includes or excludes the expense. Third, some firms have a footnote indicating exclusion, but we confirmed from
press releases and analyst reports that the forecasts include the expense, consistent with the Bear Stearns analysis.
See Baik, Farber, and Petroni (2009) for other caveats regarding use of the First Call footnote file.
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firm’s fiscal year 2005 on the I/B/E/S summary file; (iii) at least one observation of stock-based
compensation expense for a year prior to 2005, to calculate σ(COMPXA); (iv) institutional
holdings data from Thompson Financial; and (iv) non-missing 2005 market value of equity, total
assets, net income before extraordinary items, number of shares outstanding, and book value of
equity. We obtain accounting data from Compustat, market value of equity from CRSP, and
analyst earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S. Because early adoption of the grant date value
measurement approach in SFAS 123 may confound our inferences, we eliminate firms that
voluntary recognize stock-based compensation expense (McConnell et al., 2003).24 The
resulting sample comprises 1,845 firms that meet our data requirements, 98 Street Excluders and
1,747 Street Includers.
To determine which of our 1,845 sample firms are Pro Forma Excluders and Pro Forma
Includers, we hand-collected earnings announcements for fiscal 2006 for each firm from the
SEC’s website. We inspected earnings announcements that include the words “non-GAAP” or
“pro forma” to identify firms that disclosed a measure of non-GAAP earnings or earnings per
share that is reconciled to GAAP earnings or earnings per share, as required by the SEC, and the
reconciliation shows that the non-GAAP measure excludes stock-based compensation expense.25
If the firm discloses a non-GAAP measure for fiscal 2006 that (i) excludes stock-based
compensation expense and (ii) is reconciled with net income (or a net income-derived measure,
such as earnings per share), we code it as a Pro Forma Excluder (344 firms), otherwise we code
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These eliminations were of potential Street Includers; no Street Excluder voluntarily recognized the expense.
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 107 requires firms that disclose a non-GAAP earnings measure to label the
measure as non-GAAP and reconcile the non-GAAP measure to the most comparable GAAP measure, namely
earnings or earnings per share. Some firms disclose other earnings-based measures typically labeled “adjusted
EBITDA” or something similar. We do not label these firms as Pro Forma Excluders unless the firm also excludes
stock-based compensation expense from a non-GAAP measure of earnings or earnings per share that is reconciled to
GAAP earnings or earnings per share
24
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it as a Pro Forma Includer (1,501 firms).26
Our opportunism tests use data only from 2005 and, thus, are based on 1,845
observations. Our predictive ability tests use data from 1998 to 2005. Our sample period begins
in 1998 because stock-based compensation expense is available beginning in 1996 and equation
(5) requires lagged change in stock-based compensation expense. Thus, for our predictive ability
tests, we use 8,406 firm-year observations, 601 (1,742) of which are Street (Pro Forma)
Excluders and 7,805 (6,664) of which are Street (Pro Forma) Includers.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample and data. Panel A presents the
distribution of our 1,845 sample firms by Street and Pro Forma Includer and Excluder
classifications. Panel A reveals that firms and analysts differ in their exclusion of stock-based
compensation expense for 256 firms—251 of the 344 Pro Forma Excluders are Street Includers,
and 5 of the 98 Street Excluders are Pro Forma Includers.27 These differences between firms and
analysts suggest that different factors explain exclusion of the expense from pro forma and Street
earnings. Table 1, panel B, presents the industry composition of the sample. Of seven industries
in our sample, the largest numbers of excluders are in the Computers industry, 170 of 344 Pro
Forma Excluders and 70 of 98 Street Excluders.28
Table 1, panel C, presents descriptive statistics for the 2005 amounts relating to variables
used in our tests, separately for Pro Forma Excluders and Includers. The t-statistics (Wilcoxon
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Street and Pro Forma Includers could include firms with exclusions of other, possibly recurring, earnings
components. To the extent that the incentives for stock-based compensation expense exclusion are the same as for
exclusion of other earnings components our tests will be biased against finding support for the opportunism
explanation. However, exclusions of other earnings components will not affect our predictive ability tests because
those tests focus only on the predictive ability of stock-based compensation expense.
27
Bhattacharya et al. (2003) reports that Street and pro forma earnings differ about one-third of the time and, thus,
our proportion of 14% (256/1,845) might appear low. However, our sample includes firms that did not have
exclusions from either Street or pro forma earnings, which appear as firms for which analysts and managers agree,
whereas the Bhattacharya et al. (2003) sample includes only firms with exclusions of one or the other type.
28
In section 6.3 we estimate equations (1), (4), and (5) separately for computer and non-computer firms.
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Z-statistics) test for differences in means (ranks) of the variables between the two groups of
firms. Panel B reveals significant differences for Pro Forma Excluders and Includers, except for
the median of dispersion of analyst forecasts, σ(AF). For example, the panel reveals that Pro
Forma Excluders have significantly higher earnings, EARN; the means (medians) for Pro Forma
Excluders and Pro Forma Includers are 0.05 and –0.03 (0.07 and 0.05) and the t-statistic (Zstatistic) is 4.06 (6.05). The panel also reveals that Pro Forma Excluders are larger, SIZE, have
lower book-to-market ratios, BM, and have more stock-based compensation expense, COMPXA.
They also have significantly higher unexpected earnings, IPOSSURP; more frequently would
have reported a loss if stock-based compensation expense were included in net income, ILOSS;
have more variable stock-based compensation expense, σ(COMPX); have less dispersion in
analyst forecasts, σ(AF); have more institutional investors, INSTIT; have greater analyst
coverage, ANALYSTS; and are less likely to be covered by one of the seven brokerage firms that
had a policy of including stock-based compensation expense in analyst forecasts, POLICY.
Panel D presents analogous statistics for Street Excluders and Includers, and reveals differences
in means and medians similar to those in panel C.
Table 1, panel E, presents correlations between the variables and untabulated statistics
indicate that many of the correlations are significantly different from zero. Panel E reveals that
the signs of the correlations between EX_STREET and EX_PROFORMA and the other variables
we use in our analyses are the same. However, it also reveals that the correlation between
EX_STREET and EX_PROFORMA is 0.46. Thus, exclusions of stock-based compensation
expense by analysts and managers are positively, but not perfectly correlated. We base our
inferences on the multivariate relations specified in equations (1) through (5).
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6. Results
6.1. Opportunism
Table 2 presents summary statistics from estimating four versions of equation (1). The
first (third) version focuses on explaining exclusion of stock-based compensation expense from
pro forma (Street) earnings and, thus, EX_PROFORMA (EX_STREET) is the dependent variable.
The second (fourth) version differs from the first (third) in that it also includes EX_STREET
(EX_PROFORMA) as an explanatory variable to permit us to test whether the incentives explain
exclusions from pro forma (Street) earnings incremental to their association with exclusion from
Street (pro forma) earnings.
Regarding exclusion from pro forma earnings, consistent with the opportunism
explanation, the first set of columns reveals that the likelihood of excluding stock-based
compensation expense is significantly higher for firms with a larger expense (COMPXA t-stat. =
3.54), for firms that beat analyst expectations in the prior year, (IPOSSURP t-stat. = 2.75), when
including stock-based compensation expense in the prior year would have caused an otherwise
profitable firm to report a loss, although not significantly so (ILOSS t-stat. = 1.23), and for firms
with greater historical volatility of stock-based compensation expense (σ(COMPXA) t-stat. =
3.41).
The first set of columns also reveals that exclusion is significantly more likely when more
analysts follow the firm (ANALYSTS t-stat. = 5.64) and the firm has greater institutional
ownership (INSTIT t-stat. = 2.02). There is no significant relation between pro forma exclusion
of the expense and analyst forecast dispersion and whether a firm is covered by one of the seven
large brokerage houses that have a policy of their analysts including stock-based compensation
expense in their forecasts (σ(AF) t-stat. = 0.00; POLICY t-stat. = –0.17). Regarding the control
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variables, the first set of columns reveals that firms with higher return on assets and smaller
firms are more likely to exclude the expense (ROA t-stat. = 4.19; SIZE t-stat. = –2.28).
The second set of columns reveals that exclusion of the expense from Street earnings is
significantly associated with its exclusion from pro-forma earnings. This is consistent with the
statistics in table 1, panel A, which reveal that Street and pro forma earnings exclusions are the
same (differ) for 1,589 (256) sample firms. The coefficient on EX_STREET is significantly
positive (t-stat. = 11.37). The columns also reveal inferences relating to the opportunism
incentive variables that are identical to those revealed by the first set of columns. In particular,
the coefficients on COMPXA, IPOSSURP, and σ(COMPX) are significantly positive (t-stats. =
3.42, 2.11, and 3.22), and that on ILOSS is not significantly different from zero (t-stat. = 0.65).
These findings indicate that the opportunism incentive variables explain exclusions from pro
forma earnings when they differ from exclusions from Street earnings. The second set of
columns also reveals inferences relating to the other variables, σ(AF) ANALYSTS, INSTIT,
POLICY, ROA, and SIZE, that are identical to those revealed by the first set of columns.
Regarding exclusion of stock-based compensation expense from Street earnings, the third
set of columns in table 2 reveals that several variables that explain exclusion from pro forma
earnings also explain exclusion from Street earnings. The differences are that analyst forecast
dispersion is significantly negatively associated with Street earnings exclusion (σ(AF) t-stat. = –
2.08), which indicates that exclusion of stock-based compensation expense from the consensus
forecast is associated with greater disagreement among individual analysts than inclusion of the
expense. Institutional ownership and firm size are not significantly associated with exclusion
from Street earnings (INSTIT t-stat. = 0.74; SIZE t-stat. = 0.56). These findings are consistent
with analysts either responding to their own opportunism incentives or catering to managers’
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opportunism.
As in the second set of columns, the statistics in the fourth set of columns reveal that
exclusion of the expense from pro forma earnings is significantly associated with its exclusion
from Street earnings. The coefficient on EX_PROFORMA is significantly positive (t-stat. =
8.77). More importantly, and in contrast to the findings in the second set of columns, the fourth
set of columns reveals that the incentives have little power in explaining the 256 Street
exclusions that differ from pro forma exclusions.29 In particular, when EX_PROFORMA is
included as an explanatory variable, the coefficients on COMPXA and σ(COMPX) are not
significantly different from zero (t-stats. = 0.75 and 0.53), whereas they are significantly positive
in the third set of columns (t-stats. = 3.55 and 1.96). The only incentive that has a significant
relation with Street exclusion after controlling for pro forma exclusion is IPOSSURP (t-stat. =
1.91). The only other differences between the findings in the third and fourth sets of columns are
that in the fourth set the coefficient on ROA is not significantly different from zero (t-stat. = –
1.00) and that on SIZE is significantly positive (t-stat. = 2.82).
Taken together, the findings in table 2 suggest that opportunism explains firms’ exclusion
of stock-based compensation expense from pro forma earnings, and that opportunism largely
does not explain Street exclusion after controlling for pro forma exclusion.
6.2. Predictive ability
Table 3 presents summary statistics from estimating equations (2) and (3). Panel A
presents statistics for Pro Forma Includers and Excluders, and panel B presents statistics for
Street Includers and Excluders. Recall that the statistics in table 3 are based on data before 2006
and, thus, the predictive ability of stock-based compensation expense revealed in table 3 was
29

Our inferences are unaffected if we eliminate the five Street Excluders that are Pro Forma Includers.
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available to firms and analysts when deciding whether to include or exclude the expense from
2006 pro forma and Street earnings.
Turning first to panel A, the statistics indicate that excluding stock-based compensation
expense from earnings of Pro Forma Excluders does not increase the predictive ability of current
earnings, EARN, for future earnings. In fact, the panel reveals that exclusion of stock-based
compensation expense by Pro Forma Excluders reduces the predictive ability of current EARN
for future EARN. That is, Model 2 has significantly greater explanatory power than Model 1 (pvalue < 0.01). The panel also reveals that inclusion of the expense by Pro Forma Includers
reduces the predictive ability of current EARN for future EARN in that for those firms, Model 1
has significantly greater explanatory power than Model 2. These findings are not consistent with
firms including or excluding stock-based compensation expense from pro forma earnings to
increase the predictive ability of earnings. In fact, the findings indicate firms exclude stockbased compensation expense from pro forma earnings when including it would result in earnings
with greater predictive ability for future performance, not less.
Panel B reveals the opposite inference for Street Excluders and Includers. In particular,
the statistics in panel B are consistent with the predictive ability explanation, in that Model 1 has
greater explanatory power for Street Excluders and Model 2 has greater explanatory power for
Street Includers. Excluding stock-based compensation expense from earnings significantly
increases the adjusted R2 for Street Excluders (from 35.25% to 36.23%; p-value < 0.01), and
including the expense significantly increases the adjusted R2 for Street Includers (from 42.77%
to 43.63%; p-value < 0.01). These findings indicate that the treatment of stock-based
compensation expense by analysts in the consensus earnings forecast increases the predictive
ability of current earnings for future performance. As a benchmark against which to gauge the
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economic significance of these differences in R2, we estimate our equations replacing stockbased compensation expense with other expenses commonly excluded from other non-GAAP
earnings measures, such as EBITDA, namely interest, tax, and depreciation expense. In
untabulated analyses, we find that similar or smaller differences in R2 result from inclusion of
these earnings components, 0.66, 0.22, and –0.07 percentage points respectively.30
Table 4 presents summary statistics from estimating equation (4), in panel A, and
equation (5), in panel B. The first column in panel A reveals that when we constrain the
coefficient on stock-based compensation expense to be the same for all firms, the coefficient on
EARNt is significantly positive (t-stat. = 15.22), indicating, as expected, that current EARN is a
significant predictor of future EARN. The first column also reveals that the coefficient on
COMPXA is significantly negative (t-stat. = –2.30), which indicates that, on average, stock-based
compensation expense is a significant predictor of future EARN—the larger is current stockbased compensation expense, the smaller is future EARN. In addition, the coefficient on SIZE is
significantly positive (t-stat. = 2.29) and that on BM is significantly negative (t-stat. = –6.04).
The second column in panel A presents summary statistics from equation (4) when we
permit the coefficient on COMPXA to vary for Pro Forma Excluders, i.e., with EX =
EX_PROFORMA. The second column reveals the same inferences for SIZE, BM, and EARNt, as
the first column. More importantly for our research question, the second column reveals that the
coefficients on COMPXA are significantly negative for Pro Forma Includers and Pro Forma
Excluders (coef. = –0.37, t-stat. = –4.08 for Includers; coef. = –0.14, p-value < 0.01 for
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In both panels, the R2s of both Model 1 and Model 2 are higher for Includers than for Excluders. The R2s in panel
A for Pro Forma Includers (Excluders) are 46.88% and 45.61% (28.64% and 30.16%), and in panel B for Street
Includers (Excluders) are 42.77% and 43.63% (36.23% and 35.25%). The smaller R2s for Excluders is consistent
with Excluders having more transitory earnings components than Includers. However, differences in R2s between
Includers and Excluders do not affect our inferences, which are based on the difference in R2s for Model 1 and
Model 2 within each Includer and Excluder group, not between the groups. The only difference between Model 1
and Model 2 is whether stock-based compensation expense is included in the explanatory earnings variable.
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Excluders), and that the difference between the two coefficients is not significantly different
from zero (EX*COMPXA coef. = 0.23, t-stat. = 1.38). These findings do not support the
predictive ability explanation for pro forma earnings. That is, as in table 3, table 4, panel A,
provides no evidence that firms exclude stock-based compensation expense from pro forma
earnings to create an earnings measure with greater predictive ability for future performance.
As in table 3, the third column of panel A reveals the opposite inferences for Street
earnings. In particular, the third column reveals that stock-based compensation expense has
predictive ability for future EARN for Street Includers (coef. = –0.22, t-stat. = –2.60), and the
same is not true for Street Excluders. The coefficient on EX*COMPXA of 0.23 (t-stat. = 2.28)
results in a total coefficient on COMPXA for Street Excluders of 0.01 (α2 + φ1 = –0.22 + 0.23),
which is not significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.78). These findings support the
predictive ability explanation for Street earnings. That is, as in table 3, table 4, panel A, provides
evidence that analysts exclude stock-based compensation expense from Street earnings to create
an earnings measure with greater predictive ability for future performance.
Table 4, panel B, presents summary statistics from equation (5) that are analogous to
those in panel A from equation (4), and reveal similar inferences. In particular, the first column
of panel B reveals that when we constrain the coefficient on ∆COMPXA to be the same for Pro
Forma Includers and Excluders, ∆COMPXA has predictive ability for future ∆EARN (t-stat. = –
3.88). In addition, the second column reveals that exclusion of stock-based compensation
expense from pro forma earnings is not associated with differences in predictive ability. The
coefficients on COMPXA are significantly negative for Pro Forma Includers and Pro Forma
Excluders (coef. = –0.73, t-stat. = –5.38 for Pro Forma Includers; coef. = –0.14, p-value < 0.01
for Pro Forma Excluders), and the difference between the coefficients is not significantly
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different from zero (coef. on EX*∆COMPXA = 0.59, t-stat. = 1.47). In contrast, as in panel A,
the third column reveals that changes in stock-based compensation expense have predictive
ability for future changes in EARN for Street Includers (coef. = –0.47, t-stat. = –4.54), and the
same is not true for Street Excluders. The significant positive coefficient on EX*COMPXA
(coef. = 0.45, t-stat. = 2.99) indicates that, for Street Excluders, the total effect of COMPXA is –
0.02 (α2 + φ1 = –0.47 + 0.45) which is not significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.60).
Taken together, the findings in table 4 support the predictive ability explanation for
exclusion of stock-based compensation expense from Street earnings, but not from pro forma
earnings. The findings indicate that the expense has predictive ability for future earnings for Pro
Forma Excluders as well as Pro Forma Includers. In contrast, not only does stock-based
compensation expense have less predictive ability for future earnings for Street Excluders than
for Street Includers, but also the expense has no significant predictive ability for future earnings
for Street Excluders yet has significant predictive ability for Street Includers.
6.3. Additional analyses
6.3.1. Decomposition of exclusion from Street earnings
To the extent opportunism is associated with the predictive ability of stock-based
compensation expense, our inferences regarding either explanation may be confounded. To
investigate this possibility, we decompose the indicator variable for exclusion from Street
earnings, EX = EX_STREET, into the predicted value, EX_PRED, and the residual, EX_RES,
based on estimated coefficients from equation (1) and estimate the following modified versions
of equations (4) and (5).
EARNt+1 = α0 + α1 EARNt + α2 COMPXAt + φ0 EX_PRED+ φ1 EX_PRED*COMPXAt
+ φ2 EX_RES + φ3 EX_RES*COMPXAt + α3 SIZEt + α4 BMt + εt
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(6)

∆EARNt+1 = α0 + α1 ∆EARNt + α2 ∆COMPXAt + φ0 EX_PRED+ φ1 EX_PRED*∆COMPXAt
+ φ2 EX_RES + φ3 EX_RES*∆COMPXAt + α3 SIZEt + α4 BMt + εt

(7)

If the variables in equation (1) do (do not) explain the differences in predictive ability of stockbased compensation expense for future earnings between Street Includers and Street Excluders
evident in table 4, then we expect the table 4 differences to be attributable to the predicted
(residual) component of EX. Thus, if opportunism does (does not) explain the differences in
predictive ability, we expect (φ1) φ3 differs significantly from zero in a way that evidences less
predictive ability for COMPXA or ∆COMPXA.
Table 5 presents summary statistics from estimating equation (6), in the first column, and
equation (7), in the second column. Consistent with table 4, table 5 reveals that the coefficients
on COMPXA and ∆COMPXA are significantly negative (t-stats. = –2.31 and –3.56). More
importantly for our research question, the coefficients on EX_RES*COMPXA and
EX_RES*∆COMPXA are both significantly positive (t-stats. = 2.85 and 2.31), and the
coefficients on EX_PRED*COMPXA and EX_PRED*∆COMPXA are not significantly different
from zero (t-stats. = 0.56 and 0.36). These findings indicate that differences in the predictive
ability of stock-based compensation expense between Street Excluders and Street Includers are
not associated with the variables in equation (1), which supports the inference that analysts
exclude the expense from Street earnings to obtain an earnings number with greater predictive
ability for firm performance.
6.3.2. Computer firms and non-computer firms
High technology firms were among the most vocal opponents to recognizing stock-based
compensation expense and table 1, panel B, reveals that computer firms comprise a large portion
of the sample. Thus, we investigate whether our findings apply to both computer and non34

computer firms by estimating our equations separately for the two groups of firms. The results
should be viewed with caution, given the smaller number of observations underlying these
estimations than in our primary tests.
Table 6, panel A, presents summary statistics from equation (1) estimated separately for
computer and non-computer firms and, in the case of EX = EX_STREET, modified to include
EX_PROFORMA as an explanatory variable. The first two columns of panel A, relating to
exclusions from pro forma earnings, i.e., EX = EX_PROFORMA, reveal that the regression
explanatory power is approximately the same for firms in both industry groups (McFadden R2 =
9.48% for Computer firms and 6.24% for Non-Computer firms), although different variables are
significant in explaining exclusion for the two types of firms. In particular, the coefficients on
IPOSSURP and σ(COMPX) are significantly different from zero for Computer firms, but not
Non-Computer firms, and the coefficients on COMPXA and ILOSS are significantly different
from zero for Non-Computer firms, but not Computer firms. The coefficients on ANALYSTS and
INSTIT are significantly different from zero for both Computer and Non-Computer firms.
The second two columns relating to exclusions from Street earnings, i.e., when EX =
EX_STREET, also reveal that the regression explanatory power is approximately the same for
firms in both industry groups (McFadden R2 = 49.18% for Computer firms and 54.99% for NonComputer firms), and that, as with pro forma exclusions, different variables are significant in
explaining Street earnings exclusion for firms in the two industry groups. For example, the
coefficients on EX_PROFORMA and SIZE are significantly different from zero for both groups
of firms, but those on σ(COMPX) and ANALYSTS are significantly different only for NonComputer firms. One explanation for the results in panel A is that the strengths of the various
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incentives vary by industry, for example, avoiding losses may be more important for noncomputer firms.
Table 6, panel B, presents summary statistics from estimating equation (4) for EX =
EX_PROFORMA (EX = EX_STREET) for Computer and Non-Computer firms in the first
(second) set of columns. The results for EX = EX_PROFORMA reveal the same inferences for
firms in both industry groups as does table 5. In particular, for Pro Forma Excluders and
Includers, stock-based compensation expense has predictive ability for future earnings. The total
coefficients on COMPXA for Pro Forma Includers and Excluders are significantly negative (for
Computer Pro Forma Includers and Excluders, coef. = –0.52, t-stat. = –2.37 and coef. = –0.15, pvalue <0.01; for Non-Computer Pro Forma Includers and Excluders, coef. = –0.42, t-stat. = –2.73
and coef. = –0.56, p-value <0.01).
The results for EX = EX_STREET in the second set of columns also reveal the same
inferences as does table 5. The coefficient on COMPXA is significantly negative for Computer
and Non-Computer Street Includers (coefs. = –0.37 and –0.57; t-stats. = –2.38 and –3.42), and
not significantly different from zero for Computer and Non-Computer Street Excluders (coefs. =
–0.08 and 0.31; p-values = 0.28 and 0.30). In addition, the difference in the coefficients is
significantly positive for firms in both industry groups (t-stats. = 2.43 and 3.99 for Computer and
Non-Computer firms). These results indicate that regardless of whether the firm is in the
computer industry, analysts exclude stock-based compensation expense when it has no predictive
ability for firm performance, but increasing the predictive ability of earnings does not explain
exclusion of the expense from pro forma earnings by managers.
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6.3.3. First Call footnote file data
As explained in Section 5, we use the Bear Stearns U.S. Equity Research list of excluders
to identify Street Excluders instead of the First Call footnote file because we believe it more
reliably identifies these firms. Nonetheless, in this section we use the footnote file data to
provide a validity check on our analyses.
The footnote file indicates that the consensus forecasts of 2006 earnings for 268 firms (75
Street Excluders and 193 Street Includers) exclude stock-based compensation expense.
Consistent with errors in the footnote file (see footnote 23), untabulated statistics reveal that the
mean of an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s 2006 consensus earnings forecast has a
footnote in the file indicating that stock-based compensation expense is excluded from the
forecast, and zero otherwise, is 0.77 for Street Excluders and 0.11 for Street Includers. If the
footnote file and the Bear Stearns’ classification were the same, the mean for Street Excluders
(Street Includers) would be 1.00 (0.00). Also, the untabulated correlation between EX_STREET
and the footnote file-based indicator variable is 0.42. More importantly, despite the apparent
errors, untabulated findings based on the footnote file indicator variable reveal the same
inferences relating to our research questions as those based on EX_STREET.
The footnote file also permits us to obtain some insight into whether the phenomenon we
study is limited to forecasts of earnings for 2006, the first year of mandatory expensing; Bear
Stearns did not repeat its analysis for forecasts of 2007 earnings. The footnote file indicates that
stock-based compensation expense is excluded from the 2007 consensus earnings forecast for
258 firms—a reduction of only ten firms from the 2006 forecast footnote file. This minor
reduction suggests that disagreement on whether to include the expense continues and is not a
one-year phenomenon associated with the transition to SFAS 123R.
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6.3.4. Option plan modifications
Choudhary, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2009) documents that some firms accelerated
vesting of employee options, and Brown and Lee (2006) and Johnston and Rock (2006) find that
firms cut back on their use of option-based compensation, both in anticipation of mandatory
recognition of stock-based compensation expense. A question these studies raise is whether our
finding of differences in predictive ability between Street Includers and Street Excluders are
driven by cross-sectional differences in firms that accelerate vesting or reduce their reliance on
option-based compensation. To provide evidence on this possibility, we obtained data on option
grants for 2005 and 2006 from Equilar. We were able to obtain these data for 79 Street
Excluders and 1,451 Street Includers. Untabulated statistics reveal that the correlation between
the number of options granted in 2005 and 2006 for Street Excluders (Street Includers) is 0.46
(0.47). These statistics do not reveal a systematic difference in option grant changes between the
two groups of firms.
7. Conclusion
Accounting for stock-based compensation is one of the most controversial topics
addressed by accounting standard setters. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
123R requires firms to recognize stock-based compensation expense beginning in 2006. Yet,
some firms’ managers exclude the expense from pro forma earnings and some firms’ analysts
exclude it from Street earnings. We seek to understand what explains the differences across
firms in the exclusion of stock-based compensation expense from these two earnings measures.
We test two explanations for the exclusions—opportunism and predictive ability. Based on the
opportunism explanation, we expect that managers are more likely to exclude the expense in
order to manage investor perceptions; based on the predictive ability explanation, we expect that
38

analysts are more likely to exclude the expense when exclusion results in a measure of earnings
that has greater predictive ability for future firm performance.
Regarding opportunism, we find that incentives to increase earnings, smooth earnings,
and meet earnings benchmarks are significantly positively related to exclusion from pro forma
earnings. However, when we control for exclusion from pro forma earnings, we find that only
the incentive to meet earnings benchmarks incrementally explains exclusions from Street
earnings. These findings indicate that opportunism explains pro forma exclusions, and that
Street exclusions largely are not directly associated with opportunism. Regarding predictive
ability, we find earnings that excludes (includes) stock-based compensation expense has
significantly greater predictive ability for future earnings for firms whose Street earnings
excludes (includes) the expense. However, these findings do not apply to pro forma earnings. In
fact, we find the opposite—earnings that includes (excludes) stock-based compensation expense
has significantly greater predictive ability for future earnings for firms whose pro forma earnings
excludes (includes) the expense. Together, the findings indicate that predictive ability explains
analysts’ exclusions of stock-based compensation expense from Street earnings, but does not
explain managers’ exclusions of the expense from pro forma earnings.
By examining how managers and analysts determine pro forma and Street earnings in
response to the highly controversial requirements of SFAS 123R, we provide insight into how
key market participants respond to changes in GAAP and into the controversy surrounding the
recognition of stock-based compensation expense. Our findings indicate that changes in the
definition of GAAP earnings are excluded from analysts’ earnings forecasts when the change
fails to reflect information relevant to predicting the firm’s fundamentals, and are excluded from
firm’s pro forma earnings when the exclusion gives the perception of higher and smoother
39

earnings, and aids in meeting earnings benchmarks. Thus, our findings suggest that the
controversy may be attributable to cross-sectional variation in the relevance of the expense for
equity valuation, as well as to differing incentives of key market participants.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A. Number of Street and Pro Forma Earnings Includer and Excluder Firms

Pro Forma Earnings

Includers
Excluders
Total

Street Earnings
Includers
Excluders
1,496
5
251
93
1,747
98

Total
1,501
344
1,845

Panel B. Industry Classification of Sample Firms

Industry
Pharmaceuticals
Durable Manufacturers
Computers
Transportation
Retail
Insurance and Real Estate
Services
Total

Pro Forma
Includers
Excluders
182
24
450
79
252
170
150
10
229
23
16
5
222
33
1,501
344

Street
Includers
Excluders
197
9
516
13
352
70
159
1
250
2
20
1
253
2
1,747
98
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Total
206
529
422
160
252
21
255
1,845

Table 1 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics
Panel C. Descriptive Statistics – Pro Forma Excluders and Includers

Variable
COMPXA
IPOSSURP
ILOSS
σ(COMPXA)
σ(AF)
ANALYSTS
INSTIT
POLICY
EARN
SIZE
BM
EX_STREET

Pro Forma Excluders (344 firms)
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.76
1.00
0.43
0.11
0.00
0.32
0.02
0.01
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.01
10.43
8.00
7.69
0.71
0.77
0.25
0.62
1.00
0.49
0.05
0.07
0.13
7.00
6.84
1.44
0.35
0.31
0.26
0.27
0.00
0.44

Pro Forma Includers (1,501 firms)
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.65
1.00
0.48
0.05
0.00
0.22
0.01
0.00
0.03
0.01
0.00
0.05
7.38
5.00
5.86
0.66
0.72
0.27
0.56
1.00
0.50
–0.03
0.05
0.36
6.65
6.47
1.52
0.43
0.38
0.46
0.00
0.00
0.06
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t-stat.
5.86
4.03
4.43
6.24
–1.90
8.18
3.24
2.10
4.06
3.92
–3.22
22.47

Wilcoxon Z
11.33
4.01
4.40
11.50
–1.46
7.50
3.09
2.10
6.05
4.12
–4.44
19.91

Table 1 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics
Panel D. Descriptive Statistics – Street Excluders and Includers

Variable
COMPXA
IPOSSURP
ILOSS
σ(COMPXA)
σ(AF)
ANALYSTS
INSTIT
POLICY
EARN
SIZE
BM
EX_PROFORMA

Street Excluders (98 firms)
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.83
1.00
0.38
0.11
0.00
0.32
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.002
0.001
0.002
16.81
15.00
8.44
0.75
0.79
0.23
0.86
1.00
0.35
0.08
0.07
0.06
8.13
7.90
1.35
0.34
0.30
0.20
0.95
1.00
0.22

Street Includers (1,747 firms)
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.66
1.00
0.47
0.06
0.00
0.24
0.01
0.004
0.04
0.01
0.002
0.04
7.46
5.00
5.83
0.66
0.73
0.27
0.55
1.00
0.50
–0.02
0.05
0.34
6.64
6.47
1.48
0.42
0.36
0.44
0.14
0.00
0.35
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t-stat
1.94
3.46
2.13
2.21
–1.42
15.03
3.09
5.98
2.69
9.74
–1.75
22.47

Wilcoxon Z
6.30
3.45
2.13
7.49
–2.55
11.26
3.02
5.93
4.55
9.46
–2.78
19.91

Table 1 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics

0.46
0.05
0.08
0.05
0.18
–0.06
0.26
0.07
0.14
0.06
0.22
–0.04

0.14
0.09
0.10
0.27
–0.03
0.18
0.07
0.05
0.09
0.09
–0.07

–0.01
0.28
0.86
0.39
–0.01
–0.14
–0.22
–0.23
–0.28
–0.12

0.08
0.09
–0.05
0.01
0.02
–0.12
0.11
0.03
0.08
0.14
0.16
–0.07

0.05
0.10
0.31
0.01
0.24
0.09
–0.04
–0.03
–0.07
0.03
–0.14
0.07

0.05
0.14
0.47
0.02
0.16
0.41
0.00
–0.17
–0.19
–0.12
–0.17
–0.09

–0.03
–0.04
0.13
–0.06
0.01
0.05
–0.21
–0.33
–0.20
–0.53
–0.15
–0.06

0.33
0.19
–0.06
0.11
–0.04
–0.03
–0.10
0.26
0.58
0.16
0.72
–0.11

0.07
0.08
–0.18
0.04
–0.02
–0.17
–0.16
0.36
0.29
0.25
0.37
0.03

0.14
0.05
–0.19
0.08
–0.07
–0.12
–0.06
0.51
0.28
0.10
0.56
–0.04

0.11
0.14
–0.18
0.23
–0.13
–0.19
–0.32
0.26
0.20
0.12

0.22
0.10
–0.34
0.16
–0.15
–0.31
–0.40
0.69
0.41
0.58
0.29

0.44
–0.24

BM

POLICY

INSTIT

ANALYSTS

σ(AF)

σ(COMPXA)

ILOSS

IPOSSURP

COMPXA
0.15
0.26

SIZE

0.46

EARN

EX_STREET
EX_PROFORMA
COMPXA
IPOSSURP
ILOSS
σ(COMPXA)
σ(AF)
ANALYSTS
INSTIT
POLICY
EARN
SIZE
BM

EX_PROFORMA

EX_STREET

Panel E. Correlation Matrix

–0.06
–0.10
–0.22
–0.08
0.06
–0.23
–0.21
–0.17
0.03
–0.07
0.08
–0.14

–0.22

EX_STREET (EX_PROFORMA) is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s Street earnings forecast (pro forma earnings
report) for fiscal 2006 excludes stock-based compensation expense, and zero otherwise. We label firms with EX_STREET equal to
one (zero) as Street Excluders (Street Includers), and firms with EX_PROFORMA equal to one (zero) as Pro Forma Excluders (Pro
Forma Includers). COMPXA is COMPX, implied option expense (data #399), divided by beginning of year total assets. IPOSSURP
equals one if NI, actual earnings as reported by I/B/E/S, minus the last consensus earnings forecast before year-end is positive, and
zero otherwise. ILOSS equals one if NI minus COMPX is negative and NI is non-negative, and zero otherwise. σ(COMPXA) is the
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standard deviation of a firm’s COMPXA for available years in 1998-2005. σ(AF) is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts for the
firm deflated by total assets. ANALYSTS is the number of analysts with forecasts for the firm. INSTIT is the percent of shares
outstanding held by Form 13-F filers from Thomson Financial. POLICY is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is covered
by at least one of seven large brokerage firms that the popular press reports require their analysts to include stock-based compensation
expense in their earnings forecasts, and zero otherwise. EARN is net income before extraordinary items (data #18), deflated by
beginning of year total assets (data #6). SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value of equity. BM is year-end ratio of equity book
value to market value. Unless otherwise noted, all variables are for 2005 and are in millions of dollars. In panel B, industries are
defined as in Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1998). In panels C and D, the t-statistic (Wilcoxon Z) tests for a difference in means
(ranks) across the two samples. In panel E, the Pearson (Spearman) correlations appear above (below) the diagonal. Sample of 1,845
firms, comprising 98 (344) Street (Pro Forma) Excluders and 1,747 (1,501) Street (Pro Forma) in the same industries.
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Table 2
Likelihood of Exclusion of Stock-based Compensation Expense
EX = β0 + β1 COMPXA + β2 IPOSSURP + β3 ILOSS + β4 σ(COMPXA) + β5 σ(AF)
+ β6 ANALYSTS + β7 INSTIT + β8 POLICY + β9 ROA + β10 SIZE + ε
Management Exclusions
Variable
COMPXA
IPOSSURP
ILOSS
σ(COMPXA)
σ(AF)
ANALYSTS
INSTIT
POLICY
ROA
SIZE
EX_STREET
EX_PROFORMA
Pseudo R2

Analyst Exclusions

EX = EX_PROFORMA EX = EX_PROFORMA
coef.
t-stat.
coef.
t-stat.
5.57
(3.54)
5.22
(3.42)
0.22
(2.75)
0.18
(2.11)
0.18
(1.23)
0.10
(0.65)
4.27
(3.41)
3.64
(3.22)
0.01
(0.00)
0.30
(0.14)
0.04
(5.64)
0.02
(2.36)
0.32
(2.02)
0.37
(2.15)
–0.02
(–0.17)
0.002
(0.02)
1.45
(4.19)
1.42
(4.00)
–0.08
(–2.28)
–0.12
(–2.88)
2.55
(11.37)

EX = EX_STREET
coef.
t-stat.
5.98
(3.55)
0.29
(2.14)
0.32
(1.43)
2.18
(1.96)
–48.56
(–2.08)
0.07
(6.46)
0.20
(0.74)
0.12
(0.67)
0.94
(1.73)
0.03
(0.56)

EX = EX_STREET
coef.
t-stat.
2.03
(0.75)
0.37
(1.91)
0.33
(1.30)
0.52
(0.53)
–50.95
(–1.85)
0.05
(4.30)
0.10
(0.30)
0.17
(0.78)
–0.52
(–1.00)
0.21
(2.82)
2.33

9.91%

22.25%

23.66%

(8.77)
53.25%

EX_PROFORMA (EX_STREET) is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s pro forma earnings report (Street earnings
forecast) for fiscal 2006 excludes stock-based compensation expense, and zero otherwise. We label firms with EX_STREET equal to
one (zero) as Street Excluders (Street Includers), and firms with EX_PROFORMA equal to one (zero) as Pro Forma Excluders (NonPro Forma Includers). All other variables are as previously defined and are from 2005. t-statistics in parentheses are based on
standard errors clustered by firm and year. Sample of 1,845 firms, comprising 98 (344) Street (Pro Forma) Excluders and 1,747
(1,501) Street (Pro Forma) in the same industries.

51

Table 3
Differences in Predictive Ability
Panel A. Pro Forma Exclusions
Model 1:
Model 2:

EARNt+1 = α0 + α1 EARNt + α2 SIZEt + α3 BMt + εt
EARNt+1 = α0 + α1 (EARNt – COMPXAt) + α2 SIZEt + α3 BMt + εt

Variable
EARNt
SIZE
BM
Adjusted R2
Goodness-of-fit predictions
Adj. R2: Model 1 – Model 2
p-value

Pro Forma Excluders
(N = 1,742)
Model 1
Model 2
0.17
0.17
(3.79)
(3.93)
0.01
0.01
(2.08)
(2.34)
–0.07
–0.08
(–5.89)
(–5.86)
28.64
30.16

Pro Forma Includers
(N = 6,664)
Model 1
Model 2
0.44
0.40
(12.64)
(10.06)
0.003
0.003
(1.81)
(1.68)
–0.03
–0.03
(–5.38)
(–5.77)
46.88
45.61

Model 1 = Model 2
–1.52
<0.01

Model 1 = Model 2
1.27
<0.01

Panel B. Street Exclusions
Model 1:
Model 2:

EARNt+1 = α0 + α1 EARNt + α2 SIZEt + α3 BMt + εt
EARNt+1 = α0 + α1 (EARNt – COMPXAt) + α2 SIZEt + α3 BMt + εt

Variable
EARNt
SIZE
BM
Adjusted R2
Goodness-of-fit predictions
Adj. R2: Model 1 – Model 2
p-value

Street Excluders
(N = 601)
Model 1
Model 2
0.27
0.22
(11.37)
(7.59)
0.001
0.003
(0.16)
(0.36)
–0.10
–0.13
(–2.21)
(–2.33)
36.23%
35.25%

Street Includers
(N = 7,805)
Model 1
Model 2
0.40
0.38
(15.51)
(15.54)
0.005
0.004
(2.55)
(2.30)
–0.02
–0.03
(–3.07)
(–3.13)
42.77%
43.63%

Model 1 > Model 2
0.98
<0.01

Model 1 < Model 2
–0.86
<0.01

EX_PROFORMA (EX_STREET) is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s pro forma
earnings report (Street earnings forecast) for fiscal 2006 excludes stock-based compensation
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expense, and zero otherwise. We label firms with EX_STREET equal to one (zero) as Street
Excluders (Street Includers), and firms with EX_PROFORMA equal to one (zero) as Pro Forma
Excluders (Pro Forma Includers). Sample of 8,406 observations of 1,845 firms, comprising 98
(344) Street (Pro Forma) Excluders and 1,747 (1,501) Street (Pro Forma Includers) in the same
industries. t denotes year from 1998 to 2004. Model 1 (Model 2) excludes (includes) stockbased compensation expense as a predictor of future EARN. The p-value for the Clarke (2003,
2007) non-parametric test of the null hypothesis that the goodness of fit of Model 1 equals that of
Model 2 appears below each pair of regressions. All variables are as previously defined. All
regressions include industry and year fixed effects. t-statistics in parentheses are based on
standard errors clustered by firm and year.
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Table 4
Stock-based Compensation Expense as a Predictor of Firm Performance
Panel A. Future Performance
EARNt+1 = α0 + α1 EARNt + α2 COMPXAt + φ0 EX + φ1 EX*COMPXAt + α3 SIZEt + α4 BMt + εt
Variable
EARNt
COMPXAt

0.37
(15.22)
–0.22
(–2.30)

EX
EX*COMPXAt
SIZE
BM
Adjusted R2
α2 + φ1
p-value: α2 + φ1= 0

0.004
(2.29)
–0.03
(–6.04)
42.45%

EX = EX_PROFORMA
0.36
(10.65)
–0.37
(–4.08)
0.003
(0.36)
0.23
(1.38)
0.004
(2.60)
–0.03
(–6.53)
42.05
–0.14
<0.01
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EX = EX_STREET
0.39
(22.78)
–0.22
(–2.60)
–0.002
(–0.38)
0.23
(2.28)
0.003
(2.03)
–0.03
(–5.75)
43.44%
0.01
0.78

Table 4 (continued)
Stock-based Compensation Expense as a Predictor of Firm Performance
Panel B. Changes in Future Performance

∆EARNt+1 = α0 + α1 ∆EARNt + α2 ∆COMPXAt + φ0 EX + φ1 EX*∆COMPXAt
+ α3 SIZEt + α4 BMt + εt
Variable
∆EARNt
∆COMPXAt

–0.02
(–0.66)
–0.41
(–3.88)

EX
EX*∆COMPXAt
SIZEt
BMt
Adjusted R2
α2 + φ1
p-value: α2 + φ1 = 0

–0.01
(–3.27)
–0.02
(–2.77)
7.05%

EX = EX_PROFORMA
–0.01
(–0.47)
–0.73
(–5.38)
0.02
(1.90)
0.59
(1.47)
–0.01
(–3.30)
–0.02
(–2.70)
7.31%
–0.14
<0.01

EX = EX_STREET
–0.02
(–0.79)
–0.47
(–4.54)
0.02
(1.85)
0.45
(2.99)
–0.01
(–3.28)
–0.02
(–2.75)
7.15%
–0.02
0.60

EX_PROFORMA (EX_STREET) is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s pro forma
earnings report (Street earnings forecast) for fiscal 2006 excludes stock-based compensation
expense, and zero otherwise. We label firms with EX_STREET equal to one (zero) as Street
Excluders (Street Includers), and firms with EX_PROFORMA equal to one (zero) as Pro Forma
Excluders (Pro Forma Includers). Sample of 8,406 observations for 1,845 firms, comprising 98
(344) Street (Pro Forma) Excluders and 1,747 (1,501) Street (Pro Forma) Includers in the same
industries. All variables are as previously defined. t denotes year from 1998 to 2004 and ∆
denotes annual change. Regressions in both panels include industry and year fixed effects. tstatistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm and year.
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Table 5
Additional Analyses: Decomposition of Exclusion from Street Earnings.
EARNt+1 = α0 + α1 EARNt + α2 COMPXAt + φ0 EX_PRED + φ1 EX_PRED*COMPXAt
+ φ2 EX_RES + φ3 EX_RES*COMPXAt + α3 SIZEt + α4 BMt + εt

∆EARNt+1

= α0 + α1 ∆EARNt + α2 ∆COMPXAt + φ0 EX_PRED + φ1 EX_PRED*∆COMPXAt
+ φ2 EX_RES + φ3 EX_RES*∆COMPXAt + α3 SIZEt + α4 BMt + εt

Variable
EARNt
COMPXAt
EX_PRED
EX_PRED*COMPXAt
EX_RES
EX_RES*COMPXAt
SIZEt
BMt
Adjusted R2

∆EARNt+1

EARNt+1
0.39
(21.30)
–0.24
(–2.31)
0.14
(7.91)
0.16
(0.56)
–0.02
(–2.05)
0.26
(2.85)
–0.01
(–1.13)
–0.03
(–5.67)
44.15%

–0.03
(–1.28)
–0.48
(–3.56)
0.23
(7.58)
0.30
(0.36)
0.001
(0.15)
0.49
(2.31)
–0.02
(–5.16)
–0.02
(–2.70)
9.02%

EX is an indicator variable that equals one if the I/B/E/S consensus forecast of 2006 earnings
excludes options expense, and zero otherwise. EX_PRED (EX_RES) is the fitted value (residual)
from the regression reported in table 2 as Model 2. All other variables are as defined in table 1.
Regressions include industry and year fixed effects. t-statistics in parentheses are based on
standard errors clustered by firm and year. t denotes year from 1998 to 2004. Sample of 8,406
observations for 98 firms for which the consensus analyst forecast of 2006 earnings excludes
stock-based compensation expense (Street Excluders) and 1,747 other firms on I/B/E/S in the
same industries (Street Includers).
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Table 6
Additional Analyses: Computer Firms and Non-Computer Firms.
Panel A. Likelihood of Exclusion of Stock-based Compensation Expense
EX = β0 + β1 COMPXA + β2 IPOSSURP + β3 ILOSS + β4 σ(COMPXA) + β5 σ(AF)
+ β6 ANALYSTS + β7 INSTIT + β8 POLICY + β9 SIZE + β10 ROA + ε

Variable
COMPXA
IPOSSURP
ILOSS
σ(COMPX)
σ(AF)
ANALYSTS
INSTIT
POLICY
SIZE
ROA

EX = EX_PROFORMA
Computers
Non-Computers
2.92
5.58
(1.20)
(2.92)
0.32
0.10
(1.97)
(1.05)
–0.21
0.44
(–0.97)
(2.29)
2.43
4.19
(2.25)
(1.33)
2.87
0.01
(0.26)
(0.00)
0.04
0.02
(2.88)
(2.12)
0.58
0.35
(2.10)
(1.70)
–0.03
0.03
(–0.15)
(0.28)
–0.03
–0.03
(–0.45)
(–0.67)
1.40
1.15
(1.69)
(2.98)

EX_PROFORMA
McFadden R2

9.48%

6.24%
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EX = EX_STREET
Computers
Non-Computers
3.03
–5.76
(0.69)
(–1.51)
0.18
0.41
(0.61)
(1.67)
0.30
0.47
(0.98)
(1.07)
–1.34
16.91
(–0.91)
(4.18)
–70.62
–34.06
(–1.45)
(–0.93)
0.02
0.06
(1.23)
(2.60)
0.70
0.20
(1.37)
(0.42)
0.66
–0.35
(2.05)
(–0.93)
0.23
0.39
(2.27)
(2.97)
–1.00
–0.88
(–0.66)
(–1.68)
2.14
2.66
(6.44)
(4.80)
49.18%
54.99%

Table 6 (continued)
Additional Analyses: Computer Firms and Non-Computer Firms.
Panel B: Stock-based Compensation Expense as a Predictor of Future Operating Performance,
EARNt+1 = α0 + α1 EARNt + α2 COMPXAt + φ0 EX + φ1 EX*COMPXAt + α3 SIZEt + α4 BMt +εt

Variable
EARNt
COMPXAt
EX
EX*COMPXAt
SIZEt
BMt
Adjusted R2
α2 + φ1
p-value: α2 + φ1 = 0

EX = EX_PROFORMA
Computers
Non-Computers
0.16
0.45
(3.84)
(20.51)
–0.52
–0.42
(–2.37)
(–2.73)
0.004
0.01
(0.31)
(1.19)
0.37
–0.14
(1.84)
(–0.57)
0.003
0.002
(1.33)
(2.03)
–0.09
–0.03
(–3.84)
(–6.22)
31.55%
47.74%
–0.15
–0.56
<0.01
<0.01

EX = EX_STREET
Computers
Non-Computers
0.16
0.46
(3.76)
(19.71)
–0.37
–0.57
(–2.38)
(–3.42)
0.01
–0.04
(0.74)
(–3.16)
0.29
0.88
(2.43)
(3.99)
0.003
0.002
(1.16)
(1.70)
–0.09
–0.03
(–3.84)
(–6.31)
31.81%
48.59%
–0.08
0.31
0.28
0.30

EX_PROFORMA (EX_STREET) is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s pro forma
earnings report (Street earnings forecast) for fiscal 2006 excludes stock-based compensation
expense, and zero otherwise. All other variables are as previously defined. t-statistics in
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm and year. Sample of 422 (1,421)
Computer (Non-Computer) firms in 2005, in panel A, with 1,981 (6,425) observations for years t
from 1998 to 2004, in panel B.
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